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Reconstitution of the Base Force of 1995: Plan or Placebo?

**A Monograph
by**

**Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Lutz
Field Artillery**



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**School of Advanced Military Studies
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ABSTRACT

RECONSTITUTION AND THE BASE FORCE: PLAN OR PLACEBO?

by LTC Stephen M. Lutz, USA, 60 pages.

A changing strategic landscape and an emerging new world order are causing a major shift in the size and structure of the U. S. Armed Forces for the 1990s and beyond. The result will be the Base Force of 1995-- a Total Force prudently tailored of active and reserve components manned at the minimum acceptable levels, but robust enough to meet domestic and global commitments. The military must be capable of supporting the National Military Strategy and its four key elements of Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution. Since the force will be smaller than today, it is imperative that a timely mobilization process be in place to allow forces to be generated as the levels of tension and/or conflict escalate. Reconstitution thus plays a major part of our National Security Strategy by providing a capability to constitute entirely new forces faster than a potential adversary can generate a credible offensive capability to threaten our vital interests.

The monograph analyzes the background and significance of reconstitution and its relationship to the emerging national military strategy for the 1990s. It reviews the doctrine and policies which have been developed to implement the concept in the military services. It further examines the merits of linking incremental reconstitution options to the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) system as a way to initiate measures to form new units early in a crisis. Finally one of the means of reconstitution, the Army's cadre divisions, is looked at to determine its potential as a method of reconstituting fighting units.

This monograph concludes there is much work which needs to be done on the underpinnings of a strategy of reconstitution. This includes clearly defining the concept, providing unity of command and effort to the strategy, writing appropriate doctrine, educating the various leaders who must execute the policies, and developing sound plans for implementing reconstitution within all the military services. Should the Department of Defense continue to declare reconstitution an economy of resources and low priority strategy, it may be in the best interests of the nation to relegate this concept to a supporting and not a foundation principle of the national military strategy. This study further concludes that reconstitution in its present form is actually a placebo, promising new military units which it can not deliver in a national crisis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.	1
II	BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE.	4
III	DOCTRINE AND POLICY.	8
IV.	INCREMENTAL RECONSTITUTION.	14
V.	THE CADRE DIVISIONS.	22
VI	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.	38
	APPENDIX A: RECONSTITUTION DEFINITIONS.	41
	APPENDIX B: CADRE DIVISION STUDY OPTIONS.	43
	ENDNOTES.	46
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.	53

INTRODUCTION

Our strategy will guard against a major reversal in Soviet intentions by incorporating into our planning the concept of reconstitution of our forces. By the mid-90s, the time it would take the Soviets to return to the levels of confrontation that marked the depths of the Cold War will be sufficient to allow us to rely not solely on existing forces - but to generate wholly new forces. This readiness to rebuild - made explicit in our defense policy - will be an important element in our ability to deter aggression.¹

**President George Bush
Aspen, Colorado 2 August 1990**

With these words, President Bush ushered in a new policy of reconstitution destined to become one of the four foundations of the United States National Military Strategy. Reconstitution is the forming, training, and fielding of new fighting forces from a nucleus of trained personnel. It is designed to send a signal of national resolve to deter a potential adversary from considering goals contrary to the interests of the United States. Should this deterrence fail, the reconstitution process allows for the expansion of the force structure from a regionally oriented "Base Force" to a global warfighting capability.² As the perceived world threats to the United States decline and the existing forces continue to draw down, a national strategy of reconstitution is logical and prudent.

Designating reconstitution as a national strategy requires linking the instruments of national power (political, economic, military) to a framework of ends, ways, and means. The "ends" are defined by the stated national security objectives of presenting a deterrence while retaining the ability to mobilize the nation and create a global warfighting capability. The "means" of a strategy of reconstitution are the military manpower pool, industrial base production, cadre units, equipment stockpiles and war reserves, research and technology, and trained military leadership. The ends and means will be linked with the "ways" of early warning intelligence systems, timely and positive decisions by the national level leadership in reaction to threat warnings, the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) system, and the doctrine and policies of the military departments.³ As America downsizes its military forces to meet the changing world, it must preserve the ways and means required to rebuild our global warfighting capability.

The military services are currently taking steps to build a reconstitution strategy through their doctrine, plans, and policies. The measure of their success will be presenting a credible capability to deter our enemies while creating new units. Credible means convincing our adversaries we have the national will to mobilize all the elements of power and build an expanded warfighting ability.

This study analyzes the development and implementation of a military reconstitution strategy. It defines reconstitution and examines its background, significance, and selected key elements. Areas analyzed include the doctrine and organizational control of the strategy, mobilization, and the Graduated Mobilization Response system. Due to the limited scope of this paper, only one of the various reconstitution means, the U.S. Army's cadre division concept, is evaluated. The study looks at national military policy for reconstitution as implemented within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Where required to examine a particular military service, this paper uses the U.S. Army with its doctrine and plans as a representative sample.

To ensure commonality of definitions and objectivity of the analysis, this study establishes several criteria to test the research findings. These criteria have been derived from the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG),⁴ the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP),⁵ and the U.S. Army Fiscal Year 1993 (FY 93) Posture Statement.⁶ The five criteria are:

Effective Doctrine: The ability to provide guidance for the implementation and execution of an effective reconstitution process. Includes policy statements, regulations, field manuals.

Adaptive Planning: As described in the JSCP, plans which have the ability to develop a varying range of responses to various contingencies. These are similar to the Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) in the JSCP.

Competent Leaders: Leaders are competent when they are clear in their vision of the future and fully developed in professional schools and operational assignments.

Timely Mobilization: The ability to initiate mobilization early in a crisis, thereby avoiding a spasmodic or surge reaction. This will allow the U.S. to sustain a prolonged or major conflict.

Investment: The ability of a reconstitution strategy to place investments in personnel, funding, and resources commensurate with the national end state desired. Cost-effectiveness is measured in goals achieved rather than minimal amounts of money spent.

Based on the "commander's intent" for reconstitution contained in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, along with the evaluation of the key elements listed, this study concludes that reconstitution is a well-accepted concept, but certainly not a plan. The desired end states of presenting a strong U.S. deterrence and creating a global warfighting capability are clearly understood by the civilian and military leaders. What is lacking is the effective cohesive plan for employment of the ways and means to achieve the goals of reconstitution. As a result, doctrine and plans are not available to guide service members on various aspects of the strategy. No one is in charge of the reconstitution effort which cuts across numerous command and staff functional lines. A major decision within the Department of Defense was to orient reconstitution solely on building a global warfighting capability. This completely eliminated the opportunity to use adaptively planned options to react to various contingencies short of global warfare. Finally, little has been done to establish the specific directions for the means used to achieve the ends of a strategy of reconstitution. This is evident by the lack of progress to date in establishing the Army's two cadre divisions.

Within the military services today there is a very low priority for a reconstitution program. Investments will be made for the Base Force's personnel, equipment, and technology prior to being committed to units not yet in existence. Thus, this economy of resources strategy⁷ will receive lip service, but not action. Reconstitution will never become a viable pillar of the National Military Strategy until the Congress and military really believe they will have to reconstitute forces. At this time the strategy is in the "too hard" category for implementing policies which commit people, funds, time and resources. The apparent trend for the next several years is to continue to cut defense spending and force structure, thereby increasing competition within the military for limited resources. Since reconstitution is based on future potential rather than its present capabilities, the strategy will surely receive even less priority and investment over the coming decades. Consequently, the American strategy of reconstitution is actually a placebo -- what we would like to have versus what we need to accomplish. The national level leadership and the Department of Defense need to rethink the issue of reconstitution.

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

A changing strategic environment and emerging new world order are causing a major shift in the size and structure of the U.S. armed forces for the 1990s and beyond. The result for the military will be the Base Force of 1995 -- a Total Force prudently tailored of active and reserve components manned at the minimum acceptable levels, but robust enough to meet domestic and global commitments. The services must be capable of supporting the four foundations of the National Military Strategy: Strategic Deterrence and Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution.⁸ Since the armed forces will be smaller than today, it is imperative that a credible process be in place to allow forces to be generated or created as the levels of tension or conflict escalate. Reconstitution thus plays a major role in our national defense by providing a capability to constitute entirely new forces faster than a potential adversary can generate a credible offensive threat to our vital national interests.⁹

The concept of reconstitution of forces is not new. Throughout history, armies from many nations have expanded to meet the requirements of war. France implemented a cadre system prior to World War II designed to expand its forces upon mobilization by dividing each existing division into three new ones. The resulting chaos in organization and lack of unit level training from this disastrous pre-battle changeover contributed directly to the infamous debacle of the French military in May 1940.¹⁰ A more successful example has been the recent Arab-Israeli wars in which Israel demonstrated the ability to add 400,000 soldiers to its standing army of 164,000 within twenty-four hours. Contrary to the French cadre experience, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) demonstrated its personnel and equipment readiness very admirably on the Middle East battlefields.¹¹

The ultimate American experience in reconstitution occurred during the period of the Second World War. In 1939 the U.S. Army was woefully understrength (about 200,000 each in the Regular Army and the National Guard) and poorly equipped with World War One-era

weapons, materiel, and doctrine. General George C. Marshall became the Army Chief of Staff that year and undertook a dramatic reconstitution effort. His major task was to overcome staunch opposition by the American people and the Congress to increased military expenditures and force structure. By the end of 1941 Marshall had made great progress and the Army was in significantly better shape. Over 1.4 million soldiers were serving in 36 combat divisions and 64 Air Groups, laying the foundation for a global warfighting capability that would identify America as the "arsenal of democracy."¹² Less than four years later, the Army grew from 1.6 million soldiers to an eighty-nine division force exceeding 8.2 million men and women.¹³

Just as a nation can create larger forces, it can also rapidly demobilize and disband them at the end of a conflict. The historical American experience has been to "free-fall" the armed forces to unacceptably low levels of manpower, equipment, production, and funding in a post-war period, creating a fairly predictable "mold" of American military unpreparedness between wars. The neglect of the armed forces then became obvious a few years later in the first battle of the next war. Places and names such as First Bull Run, San Juan Hill, Cantigny, Kasserine Pass, and Task Force Smith are mute testimony of the failure to maintain credible capabilities during peacetime.¹⁴ With the end of the Cold War, America is again entering a period in which it will downsize its military forces.

Most Americans accept the fact the nation faces a new strategic landscape with no significant threat which requires maintaining a large standing military force. During the forty years of the Cold War a bipolar world existed which necessitated an American global presence and involvement in numerous regional conflicts, including Korea, Viet Nam, the Middle East, and the Caribbean basin. The 1980s were a period of large defense investments under Presidents Reagan and Bush; this proved to be a significant factor in "breaking the mold" of traditional military unpreparedness with the highly successful performance of American troops in Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/ Storm.

But even as the military was achieving "quick, decisive victory" in the Persian Gulf, the bipolar world of American and Soviet military superpowers was coming apart. The Warsaw Pact

and Communist Eastern Europe were the first to go with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the peaceful reunification of Germany. Quickly all the former satellites of the Soviet Union were embracing democracy and capitalism as a new way of life. Next the unsuccessful coup of August 1991 caused the collapse of the Soviet Union as both a nation and a military superpower. Forty-five years of U.S. - Soviet confrontation appeared to be over and most Americans looked forward to a new world order of peace and tranquility. A sign of the changing times was the 1992 Presidential election defeat of George Bush, a respected world leader, by Bill Clinton, a state governor who focused on domestic issues rather than foreign policy achievements. The people of the United States appeared to be sending a message for a "peace dividend" to support domestic social programs, largely at the expense of future defense budgets.

The military problem America faces in this new world order is trying to determine what the threat to its national security interests are. As explained by one defense briefer, "The good news for Americans is that Communism is gone; the bad news is that it has not been replaced yet."¹⁵ Expectations for world peace, prosperity, and stability have certainly not been realized to date. Quite the opposite, there are numerous regional threats which may prove even more volatile than the former superpower stand-off. Stripped of its Cold War protective layer, the world is much more unstable due to ethnic violence, religious fundamentalism, economic migration, border disputes, nuclear proliferation, conflicting political ideologies, drug trafficking, and social inequalities. Consequently, many regional areas could erupt into conflict or open warfare, including the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, and many south African nations.¹⁶

While the world may be very unstable, there is no direct military threat against the United States since no nation capable of power projection has expressed hostile intent toward America or its allies.¹⁷ The United States will need to continually observe this changing world environment and be sensitive to the emergence of a future American adversary. Key in the identification of potential and emerging threats will be the ability of the United States intelligence assets to provide early threat warnings and indicators. With sophisticated satellite, air, sea, and ground-based

intelligence systems, it is predicted that the United States will have ample warning time to detect any strategic military buildup by a hostile nation which may jeopardize vital U.S. interests. Most official government sources indicate two years as the available warning time, however some open source documents predict as long as five to eight years advance notice may be possible.¹⁸ Whatever the actual warning time, the effects upon a strategy of reconstitution are significant. Longer lead times to react to emerging military threats negate the importance of early and rapid force reconstitution. If the United States has two or more years to prepare for war, there should be fewer requirements for short-term reconstitution investments such as modern equipment, stockpiles and war reserves, cadre units, and military manpower. Thus more money can be spent maintaining the present capabilities of forces-in-being rather than the future potential of new fighting forces. The success of this entire program, however, rests on two key events. First, the intelligence system must have the ability to identify emerging military threats. Secondly, and even more important, is the need for positive decisions and responses by the national level leadership to these early warnings. A failure to use the information provided will throw America back into the traditional pattern of entering a conflict woefully unprepared in the industrial and military instruments of national power.

The national level leadership realizes the Cold War paradigm no longer applies and military force reductions are unavoidable. While beginning the process to slash the Defense Department, many in America are trying to ensure the nation avoids repeating the mistakes of the past by retaining a credible capability to reconstitute military units in the future. This is a difficult balance to accomplish because of the limited resources available and the uncertain threat the country faces into the 21st Century. As a result, even the Base Force of 1995 is a very dynamic concept, continually adjusting to the world's rapidly changing realities. Only the passage of time will demonstrate if America has been able to learn from the past by retaining the ability to bring back quickly its demobilized military units.

DOCTRINE AND POLICY

Reconstitution was first publicly announced by President Bush during a speech in Aspen, Colorado in August 1990. As a result of this presidential initiative, the concept and terminology were propelled into service policy and discussion. The Joint Staff J-5 (Plans) became responsible to develop the idea and in March 1991 formed a group to study the issue. This working group represented all the services, the Joint staff, and the Emergency Preparedness Office of the Secretary of Defense (Sec Def). They worked together on the concept for four months, examining generation of new units, production of military major end items, and threat intelligence warning times. The group concluded its work by developing JSCP definitions for the concepts of reconstitution and regeneration.¹⁹

It is important to understand how these two concepts apply to the Base Force. For example, the Army of 1995 will be much smaller than at the end of the Cold War and will represent the minimum forces necessary to maintain acceptable risk, below which further reductions would not be wise. This Total Army force of Active (AC) and Reserve (RC) components is composed of forces-in-being and reconstitution forces. (See Figure 1). Regeneration refers to the existing forces, usually RC, which the services maintain in peacetime at levels less than full strength and readiness. During mobilization, these forces are "regenerated" to Authorized Level of Organization -1 (ALO-1) with personnel and equipment for training and deployment.

Reconstitution refers to the formation of new units which do not exist in the peacetime force structure. When conflict is imminent and Congress declares Total Mobilization, the authorization to expand the military services must come from Congressional legislation. The first new units will be the cadre divisions, which are partially formed units containing only selected senior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). These cadre units will serve as the linkage between the forces-in-being and entirely new units formed as personnel and equipment eventually become available.²⁰

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Generating the Force

... the Contingency Army




FIGURE 1: THE ARMY BASE FORCE OF 1995 ²¹

The initial difficulty in forming new units will be obtaining the Congressional appropriations required to increase military end strength. The Army Base Force of 1995 is currently scheduled to consist of 536,000 active duty soldiers.²² Title 10, United States Code (USC) authorizes the strength of the active Army component to be 837,000,²³ but the two year Defense Appropriations Act of 1992 will fund only 536,000 of those spaces. For the Army to expand to 837,000 soldiers, only appropriations authority is needed. For a force above 837,000, both an appropriation and change to Title 10, USC would be necessary. The current Title 10 limits for the other Army components are 600,000 for the National Guard and 980,000 for the Army Reserves (USAR).²⁴

Increasing military appropriations and changing force structure are significant political acts. When the nation is directly threatened or attacked, these actions will occur rapidly and with tremendous political support. In 1940, just prior to America entering World War II, "staggering" appropriations provided sufficient authority and funds to equip the military and increase defense

industrial base production.²⁵ In today's American political environment, however, reversing the trend from decreasing to increasing military appropriations will be a major effort. To initiate reconstitution early, the military would need to convince Congressional leaders that external security threats outweighed the domestic issues portrayed in the 1992 Presidential election campaign. With the United States standing alone as the world's military superpower, this would be no small task. A method to monitor emerging world threats linked with a framework to incrementally begin reconstitution efforts over time will be necessary to avoid America's traditional unpreparedness for war.

The strategy of reconstitution is clearly embedded in key national documents, including the National Security and Military Strategies, Defense Planning Guidance, and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Since concepts and guidance normally flow down to the military services, reconstitution should be evident and detailed in the doctrine, plans, and policies of the services. Except for the clearly defined end states of presenting a deterrence and preserving the capability to create a global warfighting capability, the services have not fully incorporated reconstitution in doctrine.

An initial reason for this absence is the ambiguity of the term itself. Reconstitution is not a new military term and usually conjures up the image of recreating something which previously existed, such as the 89 U.S. Army divisions of World War II. President Bush's intent was to describe the process of forming new fighting units to counter emerging military threats to the United States. Among the various services, however, it takes on a different context. Air Force missile crewmen associate reconstitution with actions at the missile silo after launching a weapon.²⁶ The Army considers the term to be the actions taken to restore a unit to combat effectiveness after heavy losses in battle.²⁷ The aforementioned JCS reconstitution working group considered selecting another word to minimize confusion among the services, including regeneration, strategic reconstitution and force reconstitution. These were eventually disregarded since the word reconstitution had come into widespread use at the national level.²⁸ While many military terms have multiple meanings, (i.e., campaign, ration, retire), it will take some time to educate service members to understand the national strategic meaning of reconstitution.

This interservice confusion is compounded by the lack of a coordinated and accepted definition of the word reconstitution within the Department of Defense. Planners in the Joint Staff (J-4, J-5), the Air Staff, HQDA (DCSOPS), Forces Command (FORSCOM), and the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) acknowledge the lack of a common definition. Staffers list various sources to derive their meaning of reconstitution, including President Bush's Aspen Speech, the NSS, NMS, DPG, and the JSCP.²⁹ Thus numerous staff agencies are working on a concept without a standard definition of the goal they are trying to achieve. This makes it difficult to educate and guide the military forces in the field. (See Appendix A for definitions from various sources.)

The problem can be resolved by publishing a definition of reconstitution in Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary. This manual is the source document for the meaning of all terms used in D&D and will provide the commonality of reference required to standardize the meaning. Joint Publication 1-02 has not been revised since 1989 and therefore does not contain the word reconstitution.³⁰ With an update at the joint level, the military services can implement the necessary guidance. The response to an inquiry to the responsible division at the Joint Staff J-5 indicates an awareness of this shortcoming; however, it will be at least one year before Joint Pub 1-02 will be revised.³¹

If the Army is representative in the development of reconstitution policies, it is apparent that very little progress has been made. Army Regulation (AR) 310-25, Dictionary of Army Terms, was last revised in 1986 and therefore does not include the current national level meaning.³² Like Joint Pub 1-02, it needs revision.

Field Manual (FM) 100-9, Reconstitution, was published in January 1992 and is an excellent laydown of the doctrine and theory of the Army's traditional definition of reconstitution (restoring the unity, cohesion, leadership, and equipment of combat ineffective units). FM 100-9 does not mention the national strategic meaning of reconstituting entirely new units, thus further clouding the already murky issue of what reconstitution means in the Army today.³³

The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS) provides mobilization and operational planning guidance to the service. Yet nowhere in its four volumes does it mention the strategy of reconstitution.³⁴ The Army's implementing mobilization documents, FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-Series, FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) also do not discuss the subject of reconstitution. These ten volumes were published sequentially in late 1991 as the strategy of reconstitution was being developed. Volume VII of the FORMDEPS deals wholly with Total Mobilization, the very foundation of building a global warfighting capability. It is remarkable that during the coordination and research to rewrite

the Army's manual on Total Mobilization this emerging joint concept was not discovered. If it had, a decision could have been made to include an early and evolving concept of reconstitution or delay publication of Volume VII until more definite plans evolved. Now the Army is left with a keystone document on global warfare with no discussion of the overarching strategy of reconstitution.³⁵

Some publications demonstrate the Army is capable of incorporating reconstitution into new doctrine. The FY 93 Army Posture Statement provides a general overview and discussion of all the foundations of the National Military Strategy. FM 100-17, Mobilization, is undoubtedly the Army's best effort at linking the entire process together and presenting the concepts to all soldiers. Published in October 1992, this document provides a linkage of mobilization, the Graduated Mobilization Response, federal agencies, and reconstitution. This is certainly a good start, but more must be done in the future, especially since the entire discussion of reconstitution is less than one half page in length.³⁶ More detailed information on accomplishing reconstitution activities would better serve leaders at the major command and unit levels.

Another glaring problem for achieving a coherent and unified reconstitution program is the lack of an individual or agency responsible for planning and executing the strategy within the Department of Defense. Since reconstitution cuts across many functional areas (policy, plans, personnel, operations, and logistics), there is no single DoD, JCS, or military service organization with the overall responsibility for a coordinated policy.³⁷ The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy has the mission to prepare the reconstitution portion of the Defense Planning Guidance which provides necessary guidance to the Joint and service staffs. However, within JCS and the military departments, there are personnel, plans, policy, operations, and logistics staff personnel all working separate pieces of a reconstitution policy. There have been some attempts to address the responsibility problem, such as forming a steering group within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), but nothing substantial has materialized to date.³⁸

A concept taught early in the professional development of military leaders is a set of "Principles of War." These keys to success on the military battlefield include "Unity of Command," which advocates the use of one commander who possesses the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in the pursuit of a unified purpose.³⁹ The same principle applies to the strategy of reconstitution; it can only be successful if one person or agency plans and coordinates the directed programs. Since reconstitution involves the four military services, the Joint Staff, the

Department of Defense, and many of the federal government's departments and agencies, a "Unity of Effort" is also required. This principle deals with coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a common objective, even though all elements may not be part of the same command structure. This cooperative working relationship based on common interests is an essential complement to Unity of Command and clearly key to the success of reconstitution.⁴⁰

Reconstitution is both an economy of resources and a newly emerging strategy. Therefore it requires close monitoring to ensure proper development and incorporation into the military strategies of 1995 and beyond. With the expected continued deactivation of military units under the new Presidential administration, the need to have a credible capability to reconstitute forces becomes even more important. This study recommends that the Joint Staff review the feasibility of forming offices for all reconstitution programs at the Joint and individual service levels. These sections would be responsible to provide the unity of command within their individual elements, and contribute to the overall federal government's unity of effort for reconstitution policies. Only with the implementation of this method will the United States government develop clear guidance and a coherent strategy for a reconstitution process.

Overall, doctrine and regulations concerning reconstitution are not available within the Department of Defense. There are many references to the strategy in broad brush documents published at the joint and service levels, but specific guidance for the implementation and execution of an effective reconstitution system does not exist. A simple step of updating the joint and service dictionaries with a common definition would establish a baseline of common reference. Centralizing all reconstitution efforts at the joint and service levels would provide direction and eliminate much duplication of efforts. Eventually appropriate doctrine and guidance would "trickle down" into widely distributed and readily available publications. In the interim service members will lack the necessary information and guidance on cadre units, manpower and equipment issues, industrial base assets, and other functions essential to reconstitution. These same soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will be required to lead and train the Base Force of 1995 in the absence of clear and firm direction.

INCREMENTAL RECONSTITUTION

The United States is a nation which only mobilizes its forces for war, and the process is normally used to augment active duty forces without resorting to the reconstitution of entirely new fighting units. To selectively build to a global warfighting capability, the federal government has established four levels of military mobilization response (Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up, Partial, Full, and Total Mobilization). The first three types deal strictly with individuals and units in the currently authorized military force structure. Total Mobilization, however, involves expansion of the armed forces by organizing and activating units beyond the existing approved troop basis. This step covers the mobilization of all additional assets required, including civilian production facilities, to round out and sustain the forces.⁴¹

The Department of Defense has oriented all plans for reconstitution toward building a global warfighting capability.⁴² This removes the opportunity to create new units through sequentially increasing responses to a crisis, waiting instead until a "worst-case scenario" develops and Total Mobilization becomes the sole remaining option. Delaying action to create new forces until the final stage of mobilization stresses the ability of the nation to accomplish the mission. The reaction becomes a surge effort which is initially inefficient and unable to meet the short term mobilization requirements, although production output over time will eventually meet or exceed requirements. A major disadvantage of this method is that it offers few real choices and places extremely difficult political decisions before national leaders. With this "all or nothing" system currently in place, incremental options are not available to simultaneously develop deterrence and create new fighting forces. Since America can not delay forming new units to counter an emerging world threat, DoD should prepare other options for early presentation in a crisis to senior civilian and military leaders. A recommended method is structuring selective or incremental reconstitution packages for use in situations short of total war. This would conform to the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR), the method of mobilization now used in the United States. Linking the concept of reconstitution with the existing framework of mobilization will help to secure early the necessary political decisions to form new units. This bonding with GMR will also ensure reconstitution transitions from merely being a "good idea" into an executable plan.

While mobilization seems to be synonymous with reconstitution, it actually serves as a foundation. Reconstitution relies on the mobilization process to provide the essential manpower,

critical resources, funding, emergency legislation, and conversion of the civilian economy to a military-industrial base. Mobilizing the nation involves shifting the use of some national resources from private to governmental use. This enormous capability and potential can help significantly in the creation of new units.⁴³

Mobilization conjures up bad images in the minds of many Americans. This is largely due to previous U.S. war experiences in which an unprepared nation had to initiate crash programs to organize, man and equip the armed forces. U.S. mobilizations have been analogous to turning on a 1,000 watt light bulb inside a closed, light-sealed room. At the flick of the "On" switch, the nation went from relative defense inactivity to an exhausting war effort. Upon conflict termination, the switch was quickly reset to the "Off" position, beginning massive demobilization and eventual return to defense stagnation. America needs to replace the "On-Off" switch with a rheostat-type control knob. This will allow the government to implement preplanned and graduated levels of increasing responses over time. Thus, instead of going immediately from a dead start to maximum effort, the nation can prepare for global war gradually in response to early threat warnings. Such a mobilization program makes good sense for America.⁴⁴

The Graduated Mobilization Response System is a flexible decision making process which addresses American mobilization requirements. GMR attempts to use the political, economic, and military instruments of power to calibrate appropriate responses to potential emergencies based on the severity of warning indicators and actual events. With GMR, national leaders are provided tailored responses through incremental steps to increase the national security emergency preparedness posture. These calculated actions are usually reversible to allow the government to range the spectrum of mobilization readiness without committing to total war.⁴⁵ Structured in a mobilization framework, GMR is specifically designed to "enhance deterrence, mitigate the impact of an event or crisis, and reduce significantly the lead time associated with a mobilization should the crisis intensify."⁴⁶

Graduated Mobilization Response can trace its origins to July 1979 when President Carter's Executive Order 12148 created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The purpose of this organization is to consolidate civil defense and emergency management functions into one federal agency. Over time, FEMA has developed the ways and means to coordinate federal, state, and local government plans with industry to achieve national preparedness. Additionally, there developed the need to provide political, economic, and military alternatives to a

total mobilization of the United States for a general war in Europe. From the 1950s through the 1980s, all emergency preparedness planning had centered on the worst case scenarios of a surprise nuclear attack on the United States or a short warning Soviet attack on Western Europe. This restricted strategic planning and did not take into account other scenarios, such as regional conflict or protracted war preceded by sufficient early warning.⁴⁷ Finally in 1988, both the President's National Security Strategy statement and Executive Order 12656 institutionalized a system for all federal departments and agencies to respond to national security emergencies, foreign and domestic, by:

1. Identifying those actions to be implemented early on in a potential national security emergency which could mitigate or significantly reduce the lead times associated with a total national emergency mobilization.
2. Developing a system to be used in a national security emergency which provides issues, alternatives, and a process to consider at various levels of the emergency.⁴⁸

Additionally, Executive Order 12656 identified FEMA as the government agency responsible for identifying and coordinating national security emergency measures with all other federal departments and agencies.⁴⁹ This important step gave the proponent responsibility for mobilization to a single agency. As previously noted, to achieve a coherent national mobilization policy among the federal, state, and local governments, it is imperative that one organization be in charge.

From 1988 to 1990 GMR developed from a concept to a strategy by the joint cooperative effort of FEMA and the Department of Defense. As a result of these numerous civil and military meetings, GMR has fully evolved as policy for the Department of Defense's concept of mobilization, with the possibility of linking it with the emerging concept of reconstitution. The National Military Strategy of January 1992 proclaimed,

A key element in responding to this challenge [creating new military units] is Graduated Mobilization Response. This national process integrates actions to increase our emergency preparedness posture in response to warning of crisis. These actions are designed to mitigate the impact of a crisis and to reduce significantly the lead time associated

with responding to a full scale national security emergency.⁵⁰

Graduated Mobilization Response is now a true national strategy, addressing all the instruments of national power. It provides the national level leadership various incremental options to respond to emergency situations in our uncertain and changing strategic environment. The GMR is designed to be strategy, process, and framework to mobilize the nation for both deterrence and conflict.⁵¹ GMR has three stages, or levels of response, which are:

Stage 3: Peacetime planning and preparation.

Stage 2: Crisis management, for situations that have already begun to develop.

Stage 1: National Security Emergency/ War.⁵²

Additionally, GMR looks at six functional areas from which it builds responses during planning or a crisis. These are the mobilization of industrial, economic, infrastructure, human resources, government, and civil preparedness assets.⁵³ GMR essentially provides a method to "prime" the motor of emergency preparedness prior to actually starting the engine. This capability should greatly enhance the ability of the United States to respond with maximum flexibility and effectiveness to national emergencies, breaking our long-standing tradition of mobilization unpreparedness.⁵⁴

It is with these capabilities that GMR and reconstitution overlap and display common characteristics. Both are designed to initially provide for a means of deterring a potential enemy from continuing actions contrary to U. S. vital interests. Both will achieve a mobilized nation and expanded warfighting capability as their endstate. Their differences occur by the ways and means employed to arrive at their stated goals. GMR provides increasing levels of reversible steps to work gradually toward total mobilization. This offers political and military leaders various alternatives for gauging responses and initiating deterrence. Reconstitution on the other hand, is designed to be for global war and total mobilization only. As specifically planned by the Department of Defense, and stated in the National Military Strategy, reconstitution is not desired or planned for at levels less than total war. DoD strongly opposes any use of reconstitution efforts

in conjunction with fighting Major Regional Contingencies (MRC), largely due to the amount of time required to build new forces. By the time reconstituted forces would reach the battlefield, the regional conflict should already be terminated.⁵⁵ Extending the MRC beyond several years would make it a protracted war, and involve decisions on creating a global warfighting capability able to achieve decisive victory.

There is not much doubt that newly formed units would not be readily available to participate in a Major Regional Contingency. At best these new forces would be available to replace combat units which had been participating in an MRC for an extended period of time, as they rotated out of the theater. This would occur about two years after the reconstitution requirement was initiated, since it takes at least that long to organize, form, train and deploy an entirely new unit.⁵⁶ The experience from Desert Storm showed that already formed RC combat units require about one year to train before being committed to combat.⁵⁷ The HQDA standard for combat readiness and deployment of a cadre division is fifteen months,⁵⁸ a very optimistic expectation for these partially formed units to be ready. Therefore, the time period to create and train an entirely new fighting unit would have to be no less than two years.

A concern within the Department of Defense is that politicians will believe reconstitution is a viable means to create new units rapidly for use in a Major Regional Contingency. Based on that perception, many Pentagon staffers have concerns that Congress will use reconstitution as a basis to seek additional cuts in the currently planned base force. Some legislators believe that the nation could maintain a smaller peacetime force structure and quickly reconstitute military forces to address each crisis as the needs arise. The ability to rapidly form new units clearly does not exist, and is not an intent of a strategy of reconstitution.⁵⁹ Such a policy would be a mistake for the national level leadership to pursue.

There are, however, certain scenarios in which an incremental reconstitution effort would be both wise and advantageous. The possibility of a long period of strategic and tactical warning followed by a protracted war would be such a case. During the warning period, the United States would be able to take steps to identify sources of manpower, enact stand-by emergency legislation,

activate cadre divisions, and take industrial preparedness measures such as "warming" some critical "cold" defense production assets. As the actual conflict drew closer, the United States would be better prepared to continue toward global war, yet continuing to send signals clearly intended to deter the adversary from further hostile acts or intentions. At this stage all mobilization actions taken would be reversible, allowing a graceful and face-saving way out for political leaders on both sides. If deterrence eventually failed and global war resulted, steps to expand the force and create new units would already be well under way. America would thus overcome its history of being unprepared for war, and could now use the rheostat method of preparation rather than the "On-Off" switch.

There is no guarantee that the United States leadership of the 21st Century will do any better reacting to early warning and mobilization pleas than their predecessors. However, there is reason to hope the nation will be able to reconstitute better and faster than in the past. First, there have been many efforts to carefully document and correct mobilization mistakes from recent conflicts, such as a landmark 1955 study which developed common lessons learned from seven wars in American history.⁶⁰ These lessons have been used to rethink the U.S. mobilization system, some corrections of which were seen during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. It may be possible that America is willing to learn from the mistakes of the past. Secondly, the United States has leaders today who are more "globally" oriented than in the past. The telecommunications revolution and ease of world travel have made the world smaller by making possible instantaneous military and political decisions, as well as rapid movements of people and cargo. Additionally, the interlocking world economies have made it difficult for nations not to be involved in the industrial and financial activities which cut across many sovereign boundaries. Since the United States is now the world's only military superpower, it will be hard not to become involved as a global policeman. America has already committed to Somalia and there are many who would involve the nation in Yugoslavia. The end result is the United States can no longer realistically advocate a policy of isolationism, but must be ready to perform on the world stage. Finally, America now has a systemic approach, GMR, which forces governmental agencies and the

military to present selective mobilization options to national leaders through the National Security Council (NSC). GMR forces adaptive planning and early thinking through various responses to address emergency preparedness problems. Deterrence is initiated early on, and readiness for war is greatly increased. The United States not only has a better system in place, it is realistic, workable, and the correct policy.

Reconstitution needs to be more fully integrated into the Graduated Mobilization Response process. What needs to change is the reluctance to initiate new units at levels short of total mobilization. Military leaders should prepare response packages intended for early use in order to begin solving the tough issues of reconstitution. Some of these specific actions will require public debate and legislative approval. It is best to begin these fora and surface the issues early, working toward resolution in many areas. An additional benefit will be having our adversaries monitoring this public process, clearly serving as a means of U.S. deterrence by displaying national resolve. The end result could be no conflict and the opportunity to reset the U.S. national emergency preparedness rheostat knob to the off position.

Specific reconstitution actions which could be considered for inclusion into the adaptive planning process of the Graduated Mobilization Response framework include:

1. Requesting legislative approval from Congress for appropriations to expand the authorized end strength of the various military departments based on the perceived requirements. This could include just enough to cover the two Army cadre divisions, or a robust request to significantly expand each of the armed services. Adaptive planning at the time of the request would drive the size of the requirement.
2. Activating cadre divisions to full strength and beginning their deployment training.
3. Identifying the personnel to fill cadre positions required for the newly forming Army divisions above and beyond the cadre divisions.
4. Activating the crews and ships of the Innovative Naval Reserve, a thirty-two ship fleet of mothballed frigates.
5. Transporting stored military equipment and supplies from war reserve stocks or depots to newly forming unit mobilization stations.

6. Procuring civilian equipment and technology in "off the shelf" condition for use by newly forming units until production lines can be tooled up to produce items to military specifications. (For example, going to a commercial source such as Radio Shack for telephone, radio, and global positioning equipment to use in lieu of standard issue military equipment)

7. Initiating personnel and manpower procurement actions to help staff the needs of the services. This could range from recalling retirees to active duty, to requesting implementation of the Selective Service (conscription) system.

These are but a few of the many options available to military planners under the adaptive planning options for reconstitution in the Graduated Mobilization Response process. By initiating these well thought out options early in a crisis response stage, the Defense Department and the nation would be better prepared with newly forming units when actual conflict on the battlefield begins. A rethinking of the "global warfare only" strategy for reconstitution could result in numerous options which could be set on the shelf for appropriate revision and implementation as required in a crisis. Additionally, during the peacetime planning process, these various planning options should not be classified; rather, they should be well known and published in open source documents. This would serve the purpose of making our potential adversaries aware of the range of options the United States could execute to defeat threats to its vital interests. In this manner, the primary goal of reconstitution (deterrence) would be further advanced. When a crisis developed, the United States would then be able to keep classified which specific actions it selected to execute, thus protecting operational security.

Incorporating graduated responses into the policies of reconstitution would also require the definition of the strategy to be rewritten. This study proposes the following definition of reconstitution be accepted by the Department of Defense:

RECONSTITUTION: A national security strategy involving the forming, training, and fielding of new military units in order to deter a potential adversary from competing militarily with the United States. Should deterrence fail, a credible warfighting capability, from selective force packages to global war, will be provided from a graduated mobilization response of manpower, cadre units, stockpiled and war reserve military assets, research and technology investments, trained and experienced leadership, and expanded industrial base operations.

This statement provides a complete overarching definition applicable to all military departments in the Department of Defense. It addresses incorporating adaptive planning into the reconstitution process in order to tailor responses at execution. It also provides guidance to planners on the areas they need to consider in the overall policy of reconstitution. This study strongly recommends that the JCS consider using the above definition in Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary, and standardizing the meaning of reconstitution throughout the Department of Defense.

By adopting a graduated process of reconstitution, the Department of Defense can help ensure that the fourth foundation of its national military strategy will become a viable plan instead of merely a stated concept.

THE CADRE DIVISIONS

The new world strategic environment is creating a situation which does not allow the confident prediction of future political trends and military alliances. Therefore the United States must design its forces for the unknown threats which will emerge ten to twenty years from now. To help meet this need, the Department of Defense's FY 94-99 Defense Planning Guidance document directs the Army to consider organizing two reserve component cadre divisions.⁶¹ Accordingly, the Army has structured two of these units in its Base Force of 1995 to provide the linkage between existing forces and the new forces required.

A cadre is defined as, "a nucleus of trained personnel around which a larger organization can be built and trained."⁶² With this type organization, the Army is attempting to put in place a process to make two additional divisions available quickly while the long process of creating entirely new units is begun. Although there are numerous references to cadre divisions in DoD, JCS, and Army publications, it is difficult to find specifics on the organization, personnel, equipment, and training of these organizations. This is especially perplexing since nations have historically used cadres in their national armies.

The use of cadres to form and expand armies is not new; the need for them began when the traditional mercenary armies began to give way to the mass national forces of Napoleonic France. Their first large scale planned use can probably be traced to Prussian General Gerhard von Scharnhorst after his nation's disastrous defeat at the Battle of Jena-Auerstadt in 1806. To overcome the severe force structure restrictions imposed by France on Prussia in the peace treaty of that war, Scharnhorst implemented a furlough system to transfer active duty soldiers into a reserve militia. Annually, each active line company received twenty new recruits who replaced the twenty oldest members of the unit. These displaced soldiers were then assigned to the Landwehr, an inactive reserve militia. By 1815 this process had created a Landwehr of 260,000 on-call soldiers, administered by a 300 member cadre which served on active duty. At mobilization this cadre element would organize the units and ensure training was completed for deployment.⁶³ After Prussia's decisive victory over France in the 1871 Franco-Prussian War, the other military powers of the world, except the United States, recognized the success and adopted the Prussian reserve and cadre system models.⁶⁴

Europeans used cadres extensively during World War I to expand their armies. The Soviet operational artist V. Triandafillov noted, "[v]ery few realize that these operations (the initial successes achieved on the Western Front) could have been conducted with such intensity and with such art of maneuver thanks only to those significant cadres the Germans and French had and who insured the high qualities of the mobilized army."⁶⁵ France and Germany also planned to make extensive use of cadres during the period between the world wars. The French devised a plan which made each of its small active divisions the nucleus of trainers which split apart and formed three new divisions upon mobilization. This overextended cadre capabilities with unrealistic expectations, contributing significantly to their military disaster of May 1940.⁶⁶ On the other hand, the German Army considered its 100,000 man army of the 1920s to be the nucleus of the force it would expand to eventually rule Europe. The resulting German Wehrmacht proved highly successful against its European neighbors during the opening years of World War II.⁶⁷

Throughout the militaristic period of the late 1800s and early 1930s, the cadre concept was largely ignored by the United States. Leaders such as Emory Upton in the 1880s and Elihu Root in the early 1900s tried without success to establish a strong reserve/cadre system. A major roadblock to implementing such a force can very likely be traced to the previously cited tradition of the American public's aversion to maintaining a large standing army. Finally, General Peyton C. March was able to achieve some success in the 1920s with the creation of a military reserve and cadre system. America's obvious unpreparedness for World War I was sufficient to have legislation enacted in an attempt to resolve mobilization problems.⁶⁸

In 1920, the passage of the National Defense Act established a total Army force comprised of three components -- the Regular Army (RA), the National Guard (NG), and the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC). A significant portion of the ORC was a cadre system of officers and NCOs with the responsibility upon mobilization to organize units and train fillers, including recruits. The ORC was to be a force of twenty-seven infantry and six cavalry divisions which could round out the Regular Army and National Guard. Unfortunately, the ORC did not move from concept to actual potential until the late 1930s.⁶⁹

When war came to Europe in 1939, President Roosevelt declared a national emergency in the United States. General George C. Marshall became the Army Chief of Staff about the same time and, within two years, was able to overcome major roadblocks, significantly expanding the Army and rejuvenating its equipment and doctrine.⁷⁰ Congress initiated some mobilization steps, but did not activate any units of the Organized Reserve Corps. This failure to permit the ORC to organize and train some of their thirty-three divisions undoubtedly contributed to America's poor state of readiness upon entering the conflict in December, 1941.

In 1942, General Marshall approved a cadre plan that was used throughout the war to create triangular (three brigade) infantry divisions. Under this system, units were organized with approximately twelve percent of their authorized officers and NCOs as experienced cadre (216 of 452 officers; 1,460 of 13,425 authorized enlisted soldiers). When the organization received

sufficient fillers to reach full strength, the cadre conducted an intensive thirteen week combat training program, which prepared the unit for overseas deployment.⁷¹

The cadre system used in World War II was an overall success since more than fifty new divisions were created for service in the combat theaters.⁷² However, several problems were encountered in employing trained leadership as cadre. First, many soldiers never arrived at their cadre assignments since the Army diverted them to act as fillers or casualty replacements in Regular Army and National Guard units. Therefore, most of the previously trained cadre manpower pool never had the opportunity to employ the skills practiced in peacetime training. A second difficulty occurred when mobilization plans failed to assemble and train many cadre personnel before they in turn had to train their own units. This was particularly noticeable in the National Guard where many incompletely prepared cadre were giving basic training to new recruits. A final problem happened frequently when qualified cadres that did train new units were not allowed to deploy and fight with their units. Due to the great need for training cadres and the lack of available and qualified personnel, many soldiers became permanent cadre members. Since the American war effort needed new forces rapidly, these permanent trainers were required to keep recycling to additional new units. Unfortunately, the departing and newly trained divisions left CONUS minus many of their integrated key leaders. This had the negative impact of disrupting the cohesion and unity of many new battalions and brigades in the early stages of the Second World War.⁷³

The post-World War II era saw another massive American demobilization which resulted in the infamous "hollow Army" of the Korean conflict. As a result, the Army considered various methods to expand with cadre units during the early 1950s. In March 1951, Army Field Forces at Fort Monroe, Virginia developed a "Cadre Plan for the Army Mobilization Plan" which provided a structure to identify and train the nucleus of new units the Army would create upon demand. Once mobilized, the plan envisioned a period of 115 days to organize, train, and pre-position the cadre. An additional twenty-eight to thirty-six weeks of training (48 hour week) were then necessary to certify and deploy the new organization into combat.⁷⁴ The Army General Staff in

Washington, D.C. followed in the same year with a "Cadre Plan for the Expansion of the General Reserve." This document listed specific RC units the Army planned to create and identified which existing units would provide the cadre, as well as where the new units would organize and train.⁷⁵ This plan and others since the 1950s have been discussed, but never implemented in the U.S. Army.

Today, the American military services are looking at various ways of closing the time gap to reconstitution by increasing the responsiveness in forming new units. The Navy has two such strategies, the first being the Innovative Naval Reserve (INR). This plan earmarks eight Knox class frigates in the non-deploying reserves (Type II Reserve training ship) as training platforms for the identified crews of thirty-two mothballed frigates in the Inactive Reserves (Type III Reserve). A cadre of trainers will provide the quality control to prepare the future crews to man these ships without extensive train-up. Upon mobilization, these thirty-two trained Type III Reserve crews will be capable of activating their assigned vessels within 180 days.⁷⁶ This complies with the proposed definition of reconstitution presented by this study — providing a graduated mobilization response of military manpower and war reserve assets in the forming, training, and fielding of new units.

The second option is a joint Navy - Maritime Administration (MARAD) effort known as the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). Established in 1976, the RRF is a set of ninety-six "lightly" mothballed ships purchased from U.S. industry and located at various ports around the nation. Designed to address maritime transportation shortfalls, the RRF seeks to provide additional cargo carrying capability to the military five to ten days after activation. In early 1991, as part of Operation Desert Shield, the RRF received its only activation to date. The RRF achieved some successes during the Persian Gulf War, but numerous difficulties were encountered, including:

1. Eight of the sixty-five ships activated were non-seaworthy.
2. Very few of the ships met their target sailing dates.

3. Spare parts were difficult to obtain since most ships were purchased from industry at the end of their useful sea life and possessed antiquated steam-engine technology.

4. It was difficult to assemble trained sea crews because of the continuing decline of the U.S. Merchant Marine force. Numerous sailors on board the vessels were in excess of sixty years old.

5. The costs to bring ships up to usable conditions were almost twice the amount planned (\$1.5 million each).⁷⁷

Due to its inability to meet many expectations, the Navy and MARAD will need to carefully review the RRF concept and determine its validity for future retention.

The U.S. Air Force is not currently working on a cadre concept due to the unique technology problems of maintaining sophisticated aircraft and training new pilots. One option, the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), provides a mobilization asset for military planners to consider: reconfiguring civilian airframes for military transport. This backup transportation pool proved very viable and successful during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.⁷⁸

The Army is developing two cadre divisions based on studies conducted by the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the Combined Arms Command (CAC). These organizations designed models to provide two cost-effective mechanized infantry divisions which could meet the requirements of acceptable risk and the capability of deploying within fifteen months of mobilization.⁷⁹ Several variations were considered, including:

1. A "shadow division" concept which would locate the cadre division at the same installation as an existing AC or RC division.
2. An existing USAR training division as the base for a cadre division.
3. A mix of active and reserve forces to man the division.⁸⁰

Eventually six models were defined and analyzed against the evaluation criteria of cost, leadership, training, self-sufficiency, risk, and deployability. The models had personnel strengths ranging from 3,500 to 8,700 soldiers, and training times varying from 57 to 77 weeks.⁸¹ (See Appendix B for specific details).

The HQDA study did not recommend establishing a cadre division, but if one was necessary, it recommended it be manned by 3,500 soldiers from the Active Component (AC).⁸² The TRADOC commander recommended an option with approximately 6,000 soldiers from the AC performing the mission.⁸³ Both recommended the Active Component because it would be "the most effective component for a cadre division, involve the least amount of risk, and be the most easy [sic] to convert."⁸⁴

Having the ability to rotate leaders from troop unit positions to cadre assignments is an important element in the viability of the cadre division. Officers and NCOs need to professionally develop by serving in a position prior to conducting training as cadre. Since the reserve components do not have a readily available framework to provide this necessary rotation, many leaders frequently view the active component as an ideal choice for the location of these type formations. The major disadvantage associated with the AC is the high cost that comes with the dedicated full time personnel. These costs are not only measured in dollars, but also personnel spaces in the force structure.

Cadre assignments would use a large share of the Congressionally mandated Army end strengths authorized in annual appropriations and Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Since the cadre units consist primarily of senior officer and NCO leadership, these units are disproportional in the assignment of personnel by rank structure. Therefore, it costs the Army many personnel spaces which are in high demand in other soldier accounts. By assigning the required number of soldiers to cadre units, the Army must decide in which other areas to accept degradation (i.e., TOE units or TDA accounts). The Army could also approach the problem by asking Congress to adjust the authorized levels of officers per the legal limits contained in Title 10, the United States Code.⁸⁵ This provision specifies the authorized strengths for active duty ranks of Major, Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, and General Officers. Since cadre units consist in peacetime of only the nucleus of key leadership, the resulting grade imbalance must be addressed to gain legal relief for a "top-heavy" rank structure. A successful request would have the advantage of allowing the service to keep TOE and TDA assignments full while structuring positions in cadre units. The ability to sell

Congress on increased officers and NCOs would depend on the size of the increase requested, the associated dollar cost, and the political climate at the time of the request. If the armed forces continue to shrink and reconstitution becomes well-established as a national strategy, the timing may be right.

The U. S. Army Reserve (USAR) and the National Guard (NG) have varying opinions about performing the cadre mission. The USAR has a tradition of performing cadre-type roles (training divisions) but would require extensive force structure changes and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) conversions to have the diversity to man a full combat division cadre. The senior leadership of the USAR actively seeks to have cadre divisions located in their component, especially in light of its present orientation toward combat support and combat service support units.⁸⁶ However, due to the requirement for major force structure and MOS changes, the USAR is not a good choice for the cadre of a mechanized infantry division.

The National Guard differs greatly from the USAR in its enthusiasm toward the cadre divisions. Speaking for many members of the National Guard, the National Guard Association of the United States stated very strongly at its May 1990 symposium that, "Cadre units lack sufficient personnel and equipment to perform the mission of an organized unit. The Guard and Reserve lack a rotational based personnel system as found in the active component. *The cadre concept has no application to the National Guard and Reserve.*"⁸⁷

The MOS and force structure available in the National Guard combat divisions and brigades favorably support the cadre concept. Additionally it would be less expensive in dollars and personnel costs to man a cadre unit in the National Guard than in the active component. The lack of a rotational system to professionally develop the cadre members, however, is a major drawback to locating the cadre units in the National Guard.

Against this backdrop of detailed studies and recommendations, the Army made the decision to field two cadre divisions and locate them fully in the National Guard. Designated as the 34th Infantry Division (Minnesota) and the 40th Infantry Division (California), these mechanized divisions will be on line by the end of FY 95. HQDA, FORSCOM, branch schools,

and the National Guard Bureaus of the states involved are still developing the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for these two divisions.⁸⁸ At the present time, the authorized strength of each division will be approximately 11,500 soldiers, roughly two thirds of a mechanized infantry division's full strength.⁸⁹ Both the 34th and 40th Infantry Divisions are forces-in-being and will need to reduce force structure to achieve adjusted cadre strength levels.

Locating the two cadre divisions fully in the National Guard seems to defy all logic concerning these type units. The National Guard does not provide a viable rotation system for leadership development and strongly rejects the cadre division idea. Additionally, the plan calls for these two divisions to be resourced at almost three times a cadre division's authorized strength, a seemingly expensive and unnecessary approach. As a result, the concept being developed into a plan is not actually a cadre division, but rather an understrength mechanized infantry division. The intent to create a reconstitution strategy has clearly been violated; these units appear to serve a purpose different from their original design. The perception is that these two units are not being formed as cadre units, but rather as means for the National Guard to retain personnel positions and two division flags in their force structure.⁹⁰

Having two divisions at sixty-five percent strength may not be a bad policy. These partially prepared divisions will be able to complete training and deploy faster than skeleton units. What is wrong with the plan is that it does not comply with the intent of the National Military Strategy and the Defense Planning Guidance document. An Army cadre division is supposed to be a unit resourced in peacetime with little or no equipment and about twenty percent of the required personnel.⁹¹ Each TOE document produced by HQDA provides a listing of the number of officers and NCOs required to establish a cadre force. A mechanized infantry division with approximately 17,600 soldiers at full strength would have a peacetime cadre force of about 3,500 men and women. There is little need to spend time developing cadre division Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) since, as shown in Table 1 below, the work has already been done. Rather, the Army should spend time addressing other cadre issues such as whether to provide equipment to these cadre units, or where to locate the units in the 34th Infantry Division,

since it spans the jurisdiction of several state National Guard Bureaus. These and other concerns are clearly more relevant and important to the defense agenda of the future than renegotiating the size of a cadre division.

TABLE 1: SAMPLE CADRE UNIT TOE STRENGTH⁹²

TOE/ TYPE UNIT	FULL AUTHORIZED STRENGTH	AUTHORIZED CADRE STRENGTH	CADRE PERCENT OF FILL
01-385L100/ (ATK HEL BN)	265	77	21%
05-145L000/ (ENG BN)	903	163	18%
06-365L400/ (155MM 3X8 SP FA BN)	743	98	13%
07-245L000/ (MECH INF BN) M113	813	120	15%
17-375L000/ (AR BN) M1	550	151	27%
19-333L000/ (MP CO)	153	34	22%
TOTAL	3427	643	19%

The attempt to create a cadre division which requires regeneration as an understrength division rather than reconstitution as a newly formed division sends a very clear signal to the military, the Congress, and the American people. The reality may be that the Army does not understand what is happening in the National Security and Military Strategies of the United States. The world threat has changed significantly and America no longer faces the danger of the massive nuclear strikes or western European invasion from the "evil Soviet Empire." The failure of the Army to change from the Cold War paradigm to the new world realities may have a negative

impact on the service for a long time to come. Already there are questions and criticisms about the size, expense, and intent of the forming cadre divisions. The Total Army leadership is responsible for this diversion and should act quickly to get cadre divisions back on track, or deleted from the force structure. The unfortunate end result may be that Congress will act to resolve what it perceives as an Army failure to follow defense guidance.

If the Army retains the 34th and 40th Infantry Divisions at the strength of 11,500 soldiers each, this study recommends these units not be considered cadre divisions, but rather understrength mechanized infantry divisions in the existing force structure. At sixty-five percent strength, these divisions should be able to achieve readiness ratings above the C-5 level on the Unit Status Report in accordance with AR 220-1.⁹³ Instead of focusing on mobilization training for filler personnel in basic and advanced unit techniques, these divisions should develop Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) for combat tasks. To make maximum use of the force structure to achieve combat readiness, each division should be formed as a division with two full strength maneuver brigades and appropriate support units. This would not degrade overall Army readiness since these divisions require regeneration assets to achieve full strength prior to completing training, certification, and deployment. The Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) will make sufficient training time available to these understrength divisions as late deploying units.

The reality of the current American political climate will probably not permit the 34th and 40th Infantry Divisions to remain as robust cadre divisions. The size of the Base Force of 1995 is already questioned as being too large, that the services based it on the Soviet threat from the Cold War. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, disputes this argument, claiming Pentagon planners anticipated the fall of the USSR and structured the Base Force accordingly.⁹⁴ Whichever argument is accepted, there are strong indications the U.S. Army will reduce below the twenty division level. President Bill Clinton was elected on a platform of reduced defense expenditures and a force size reduction from 1.6 million to 1.4 million service members. The Army's share of this 200,000 person reduction is presently unknown, but the cuts will undoubtedly affect some of the divisional force structure.⁹⁵ Secretary of Defense Les Aspin

has long advocated reductions in the armed forces, his plans being based on "Iraqi or Desert Storm equivalents" with no more than nine active Army divisions.⁹⁶ The intent is clear, defense dollars will diminish and Total Army size will have to decrease over time to kept pace with the limited funding available.

Regardless of how the cadre divisions turn out, there may be a need for a cadre concept in the future of the Total Army. With continued projections for a smaller military force, senior Army leadership may be wise to reexamine this option. The farther below an eighteen division force the Army goes, the more imperative it becomes to institute a well-defined and viable force reconstitution policy. Fighting two Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) will severely tax the capabilities of the Base Force, and an even smaller Army will be less capable of addressing the requirement.⁹⁷ Since the reconstitution of an Army division will be a long process (two years or more), the need to form new units early will be paramount.

The most important element in creating new units is obtaining the cadre personnel. Without the trained officers and NCOs in place, fighting forces can not take shape. It takes years of training to create the nucleus of commanders, staff, and NCO leadership. "Growing" an Army battalion commander or Command Sergeant Major requires about eighteen years of schooling and job experience. The doctrine and procedures to procure these cadre are an essential portion of any successful reconstitution program, without which the Army is doomed to repeat France's experience in World War II.

Prior to the Second World War, the French had a "Nation in Arms" doctrine which maintained active units primarily to serve as cadre for new divisions to be formed upon mobilization for war. Due to the lack of qualified cadre, a group of low priority ("B" series) French divisions were comprised almost exclusively of the oldest and least trained reservists. In the 55th Infantry Division this meant that less than four percent (20 out of 450 officers) were a properly trained and prepared cadre. Commanded by generals called out of retirement and made up mostly of men over forty satirically called "crocodiles," three of these grossly unprepared

divisions (53rd, 55th, 71st) ended up manning the critical defense at Sedan in May 1940. This proved to be disastrous for France and a military windfall for the German Army.⁹⁸

An evaluation of the U.S. Army's cadre concept shows that little definitive progress has been made in identifying potential sources of cadre to create new fighting units. This study found only one unclassified document which attempts to determine where the Army will obtain the cadre personnel necessary to create new units. FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-7, FORMDEPS Volume VII, Total Mobilization, describes the source of the cadre, "Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM), Maneuver Area Commands (MAC), and Maneuver Training Commands (MTC), should, when all other stated missions are completed, be prepared to provide the cadre for selected force expansion units."⁹⁹

Such a policy is not only unacceptable, it is unrealistic. Particularly glaring is the statement "be prepared to provide the cadre." This clearly implies the intent for these units to be the primary source of new unit cadre. As previously noted, the USAR does not possess the force structure or MOS densities to cadre combat units. Therefore, they will not be able to provide the myriad of senior leaders required to form combat battalions of a division. Additionally, America can not wait until the ARCOMs, MACs, and MTCs complete all other stated missions prior to beginning the reconstitution of Army forces. These units all have mission requirements in the training base, mobilization sites, and CONUS defense which take them to conflict termination.¹⁰⁰ It is difficult to believe the FORSCOM intent is to begin forming new units at such a late date in the Mobilization Day (M-Day) sequence.

A second document addressing sources of cadre is the Army's budget request, the Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for FY 94-99. Volume IX, Reconstitution,¹⁰¹ of the POM is classified Secret and available only to a limited audience, primarily senior leaders in the Pentagon. This document looks at various aspects of an Army reconstitution strategy, two of which provide important unclassified guidance on cadre procurement. The first is that the Army intends to fill new units without degradation in any manner to the existing units.¹⁰² This is important because it demonstrates that the Army does not plan to "raid" any of the current

divisions to strip out the leadership necessary to cadre any of the new divisions. This is certainly a desirable option, as this study has already noted some of the cohesion and unity problems this caused in World War II. The Army's future problem will be to find an adequate source of trained and experienced cadre leadership outside TOE units. As the service continues to draw down and excess military manpower pools shrink over time, this will become increasingly difficult.

The second important Army POM personnel statement is the revelation that, "Experienced officer and NCO leadership in TDA positions will be reassigned as needed to man new units as they evolve into the force."¹⁰³ This is undoubtedly a more realistic source of procurement for cadres than the ARCOMs, MACs, and MTCs mentioned in the FORSCOM FORMDEPS Volume VII. The "Tables of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) Army" consists of positions on various staffs and programs (ROTC, recruiting) located primarily outside the combat division force structure. With detailed research and adaptive planning, TDA positions can be identified for contingency activation as cadre in a new unit upon mobilization. This low cost planning option could create the nucleus of trainers for the initial units to be formed. While the actual number of divisions requiring reconstitution will not be known until a crisis develops, having a pool of cadre available for new AC or RC divisions will greatly facilitate organization and training. Thus when a need is identified, Army planners would not have to start at the lowest level (identifying cadre), but instead could focus on activating contingency plans and assembling cadres at proper mobilization sites.

The Army must also approach cadre procurement with the realization that the TDA Army is a necessary facet of the overall combat effort which does not go away in national emergencies. Comprising about twenty-five percent of the active component,¹⁰⁴ programs such as ROTC, Recruiting, the Military Academy, Basic and Advanced Individual Training, and RC advisors will not disappear in a crisis in order to provide all their soldiers for reassignment to combat troop units. While there will be room for some war-time reductions in the TDA units, other requirements (regeneration of existing units, casualty replacements) will also impact on the numbers of personnel available to cadre new units. With a requirement for about 3,500 soldiers

per mechanized infantry division, the Army will not be able to use this method as a sole source for cadre.

The success of this planning option is contingent upon the Army having one office responsible for monitoring and coordinating all reconstitution efforts. As already noted, reconstitution cuts across many lines of functional responsibility, transcending policy, personnel, logistics, mobilization, and funding. Unity of command and effort is mandatory to plan, revise, and execute a strategy of reconstitution. Only by vesting responsibility for the program in a single agency will this be likely to happen.

The conclusion of this study is that the Army can solve the cadre problem only by using an adaptive planning approach across a broad base of available options. The primary source for the cadre should be TDA positions from both the active and reserve components. Volunteers, retirees and excess trained military manpower (released through reduction in force [RIF] or voluntary service terminations) should be maintained in data bases during peacetime for availability during emergencies. Additionally, some cadre should come from units such as the ARCOMs, MACs, and MTCs. Finally, the Army should prepare to extract a small percentage of leaders from the forces-in-being to round out the cadre requirements. This would be the least desired option, and only planned for implementation as a last resort. Unfortunately, with fewer personnel resources available in the years ahead, this step may be necessary early in a crisis.

In summary, the cadre division is an interesting concept which affords unique opportunities to accomplish reconstitution tasks early. However, with today's current force structure of twelve active and eight reserve component divisions (including the 34th and 40th IDs), this study recommends the Army not pursue a cadre concept at this time. All references to the 34th and 40th Infantry Divisions as cadre units need to be terminated; rather, these units should be referred to as understrength mechanized infantry divisions requiring regeneration as elements of the CONUS-based reinforcement forces-in-being.

With the next significant directed personnel cuts, the Army needs to immediately deactivate the 34th and 40th Divisions. This will save approximately 25,000 spaces by eliminating the two

most expendable units in the current force structure. Commensurate with unit reductions, the Total Army must increase its awareness of, and commitment to, a credible strategy of reconstitution. A conscious effort must be made to create the "rheostat-type" framework of adaptive planning options with gradually increasing mobilization responses in Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs). This would include such steps as: stand-by enabling legislation (appropriation requests; force structure expansion), cadre procurement plans, unit equipment storage, and new equipment acquisition.

Should force structure slip below levels deemed by the Army leadership to be acceptable risk (perhaps less than nine active and 6 reserve component divisions), then the creation of a cadre unit may become a viable option. This study recommends the Army consider forming a cadre mechanized infantry brigade. The assigned brigade personnel would come from an even mix of AC and RC soldiers in the two mechanized infantry, one armor, one direct support field artillery, and one forward support battalions. Rounding out the unit with a cadre brigade headquarters, and some limited support assets, the total requirement could be less than 800 soldiers. Cadre assignments would not exceed eighteen months in duration and would be limited to one tour only. "Shadowing" assignments with TDA positions would be authorized, and each soldier would be awarded a cadre Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) upon successful completion of the assignment. A completely configured brigade unit set of equipment would be stored at the unit's home station to support the training and mobilization requirements of the unit.

Locating such a unit at Fort Hood, Texas would take advantage of the personnel available in two active divisions, a corps headquarters, and various non-divisional units. Many of the cadre problems associated with the rotation of leaders through critical positions for professional development could be addressed by this collocation. Additionally, Fort Hood facilitates the shadow concept by having access to qualified personnel at nearby Forts Bliss, Sill, Sam Houston, and Polk for cadre assignment and training. Finally, there is potentially adequate space and maintenance support at Fort Hood to support a complete set of stored brigade equipment.

The main difference between this brigade cadre concept and those proposed in the past would be the intent. Traditionally, the Army perceived cadre units as existing to be the actual units which would form and deploy to fight. The reality today is that the Army cannot afford to have the personnel and equipment for several divisions waiting for the start of a global war. This new cadre brigade would exist not to expand into a fighting force, but rather to train, over time, a pool of experienced and dedicated leaders understanding the procedures required to form new units. When a national emergency develops, these trained cadre, identified by an ASI, would be brought together from the AC and RC to form the new battalions, brigades, and divisions of the determined reconstitution needs. In effect, the U.S. Army would be repeating the experience of the Prussian Landwehr of the early 1800s. Following General Scharnhorst's example, by the year 2000, the Army could identify and develop a set of trained leaders, experienced in cadre techniques and ready to form new fighting forces. Such an end state is both logical and prudent for an Army strategy of reconstitution.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States of America finds itself today in the dilemma of celebrating a victory in the Cold War, yet facing unknown military threats in the future. The only certain defense policy is that the military force structure will be significantly reduced from the previous levels of the long confrontation with the Soviet Union. How far these reductions in personnel and equipment should go is what America must determine.

The National Security and Military Strategies of 1992 and 1993 have been the first effort to define the desired military end state. Since these are Bush-era documents, the Clinton administration must closely scrutinize these policies and determine the direction America will take over the next few years. As indicated by Secretary of Defense Aspin, reductions loom ahead, but there are simultaneous pledges to maintain U.S. military superiority with a well-trained and balanced force.

Reconstitution will be the subject of much debate in the future American military strategy. As noted in this monograph, the concept of reconstitution is well accepted and understood by the civilian and military leaders of the national government. The issue is whether or not the United States can afford the costs associated with maintaining the capability to quickly rebuild its military forces, perhaps to those from the heights of the Cold War. This would involve significant investments in manpower, research and technology, production, stockpiles, and industrial base infrastructure. Additionally, the military must develop doctrine to guide each service's plans and operations.

The current National Military Strategy proclaims reconstitution as one of the four foundations of American defense policy. While this is the stated case, the underpinnings of reconstitution are actually hollow and weak. The doctrine to provide adequate guidance for the implementation and execution of such a program has yet to be written. Therefore the Department of Defense and the various military departments have been unable or unwilling to develop the plans and dedicate the resources to make reconstitution a reality. DoD doomed this concept early by designating it as an "economy of resources" strategy in the Defense Planning Guidance. As the lowest priority for funding and resources, reconstitution will never receive much more than lip service or minor investments in equipment, personnel, and infrastructure. This has the spin-off effect of not developing competent leaders-- those who are clear in their vision of the future and fully prepared to reconstitute entirely new fighting forces when the need arises.

In addition to its low priority, reconstitution has been locked out of the adaptive planning process advocated by the Department of Defense. By limiting the concept strictly to global warfare, DoD has again ensured the failure of reconstitution. Gradually increasing, selective response options short of total war are vital to provide versatility to our national leaders. Additionally, flexible options promote deterrence while building a global warfighting capability to meet possible failed diplomacy. Integrated fully into the Graduated Mobilization Response process, these reconstitution Flexible Deterrence Options (FDO) would ensure timely mobilization of all instruments of national power. Currently, the system only creates new fighting forces at the

end of the mobilization spectrum. This American tradition of preparing too late for the next war is a challenge the country must overcome as it looks ahead to the future.

In order to firmly establish reconstitution as a pillar of U.S. national policy, American leaders must invest sufficient resources in a capability to build new fighting forces. This would be an expensive proposition involving the dedication of significant resources. War reserve materiel and assets would need to be purchased and maintained at peak levels in depots. Research and technology for sophisticated weapons and equipment would be required to continue. An additional need would be establishing close coordination with civilian industry to maintain key production facilities for mobilization surges on short notice. Finally, military manpower and unit cadres would require training and monitoring in personnel data bases for eventual activation and formation of new units.

With projected longer warning times for detecting and reacting to emerging military threats to the United States such a reconstitution strategy is unnecessary. There is no major military power in the world which can compete with the United States today or in the near future. Without drastic force reductions America can ensure its national security and react to Major Regional Contingencies (MRC) without reconstitution.

The present American strategy of reconstitution is a hollow program which reads well but promises a lot more than it can deliver. It is in the best interest of the Department of Defense to delete reconstitution as a "pillar" of the nation's military strategy. This will ensure sufficient investments can be made by the individual military services to preserve the present combat readiness of their fighting units. Then the future potential of reconstitution can be a laid-up asset in the form of well-developed doctrine and plans. Linking these plans with the Graduated Mobilization Response system will also tie the strategy to early warning systems and ensure America is never again unprepared for war. With this restructuring, Americans can replace the placebo of our current military strategy of reconstitution with a cost-effective, responsive strategy that will ensure our readiness for the next conflict.

APPENDIX A

RECONSTITUTION DEFINITIONS

The following definitions of the military term *RECONSTITUTION* are provided. They have been collected from the various documents noted and point out the wide range of meanings for this strategic concept.

1. The ability to generate wholly new forces beyond the crisis response capabilities provided by active and reserve forces, and requires careful attention to the vital elements of our military potential: the industrial base, science and technology, and manpower. (*NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES*, August 1991, page 29.)

2. Forming, training, and fielding new fighting units from cadres; mobilizing previously trained or new manpower; and activating the industrial base on a large scale. Reconstitution also involves maintaining technology, doctrine, training, experienced military personnel, and innovation necessary to retain the competitive edge in decisive areas of potential military competition. (*NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES*, January 1993, page 15.)

3. Involves forming, training, and fielding new units, including initially drawing on cadre-type units, laid up military assets, mobilizing manpower, and activating the industrial base on a large scale. (*NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES*, January 1992, page 7 -8.)

4. The capability to generate wholly new forces to hedge against renewed world threats. (*DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE*, May 1992, page 5.)

5. The capability to expand military power by establishing and training new units. Actions include mobilization of assets (up to Total Mobilization) and the expansion of the industrial base with the reestablishment of a global warfighting capability. (*JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN*, Calendar Years 1993-1995, August 1992, page GL-17.)

6. The ability to continuously maintain, in sufficient measure, capabilities to create additional forces and capabilities beyond those in the active and reserve units retained in the base force. (Dr. Daniel Goure, in briefing to Mr. Lewis Libby, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, Strategy and Resources, January 1992.)

7. A national security strategy to insure the capability to expand the existing force posture by maintaining and investing in the necessary "long lead elements." The capability to reconstitute, demonstrated through policies, plans, and investments is intended to reduce

the risk of a global threat and minimize its likelihood by demonstrating the intent and capability to respond to changes in the international environment. (Mr. Michael Aimmie, from a briefing Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 6 June 1991.)

8. 1. Replace on the rolls of the Army in an inactive status, a table of organization and equipment unit which has previously been disbanded. This can be done only by the Secretary of the Army. 2. Restoring water to dehydrated foods. 3. To reform or remake, such as reconstitute a reserve. 4. The process of revitalizing medical assemblages through the replacement of outdated deteriorating items, inclusion of new items, and repackaging of containers where appropriate. (*Army Regulation 310-25, Dictionary of Army Terms*, 21 May 1986.

9. Extraordinary action that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. Reconstitution may include - removing the unit from combat, assessing it with external assets, reestablishing the chain of command, training the unit for future operations, reestablishing unit cohesion. (*U.S. Army Field Manual 100-9, Reconstitution*, January 1992.)

10. Restoring again to a former condition. (*Webster's Dictionary*, 1986.)

PROPOSED DEFINITION (discussed on page 21)

RECONSTITUTION: A national security strategy involving the forming, training, and fielding of new military units in order to deter a potential adversary from competing militarily with the United States. Should deterrence fail, a credible warfighting capability, from selective force package to total war, will be provided from a graduated mobilization response of manpower, cadre units, stockpiled and war reserve military assets, research and technology investments, trained and experienced leadership, and expanded industrial base operations.

APPENDIX B

CADRE DIVISION STUDY OPTIONS

The following six Cadre Division options were considered in the decision process for creating the units currently being formed in the National Guard. The information was extracted from the Cadre Division Analysis, Volume I, Executive Summary, Department of the Army, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 15 June 1992, pages EX-8, EX-9.

Option 1: With approximately 7,000 personnel, Option 1 has one of the largest personnel requirements; it was designed to conduct selected basic combat training and/or advanced individual training, be self-sufficient, and to have limited command field exercise capability. The division will have a robust leader cadre and will require minimum personnel in the grades sergeant through captain upon mobilization. With the high personnel numbers required to conduct initial equipment training and prepare for combat operations, the division is costly. Other factors driving the cost high are the initial equipment training and MEET (Minimum Essential Equipment for Training) requirements to maintain leader and trainer proficiency for the division's post-mobilization missions. Less risk is incurred allowing the commander more scheduling flexibility after mobilization. The division will afford its junior leaders the opportunity to be branch qualified. Deployment time varies dependent upon the component; 69 weeks active; 77 weeks reserve. If the initial equipment training mission is eliminated, the division, regardless of component, can deploy in 64 weeks. Option 1 contains the second highest cost for active, as well as reserve components.

Option 2: With approximately 6,000 personnel, Option 2 was designed to conduct selected advanced individual training, be self-sufficient, and have a limited command field exercise capability (although less than Option 1). The division has sufficient personnel in grades sergeant through captain. As Option 1, Option 2 is costly due to the high personnel numbers required to conduct advanced individual training and prepare for combat operations. Other factors driving the cost high are the advanced individual training and MEET requirements to maintain leader and trainer proficiency for the division's post-mobilization missions. A trade-off with respect to increased numbers of personnel is the fact that less personnel fills are required after mobilization. Therefore, there is a lower risk factor, allowing the commander more flexibility in the post-mobilization environment. The division will afford its junior leaders the opportunity to be branch qualified. Deployment time for the division is 66 weeks, regardless of component. If the initial equipment training mission is eliminated, the division can deploy in 57 weeks.

Option 3: With approximately 3,200 personnel, Option 3 could perform selected advanced individual training, but it is not self-sufficient and has no field training exercise capability. The division has minimum personnel in grades sergeant through captain and very limited cadre staff. Compared to Options 1 and 2, Option 3 is the least costly, with fewer personnel, having only those personnel necessary to plan for and conduct some staff

training for its post-mobilization mission. A trade-off with respect to the lower numbers of personnel is the fact that more personnel fills are required after mobilization. Therefore, there is greater risk associated with this option, reducing the commander's flexibility after mobilization. The division is not self-sufficient, but depends on external support and provides the least opportunity for branch qualification for junior leaders. Deployment time for the division is 57 weeks, regardless of component. If the division is given an initial equipment training mission, it would take the division 57 weeks to deploy, regardless of component.

Option 4: With approximately 6,200 personnel, Option 4 was designed to provide for maximum branch qualification of junior leaders. Selected basic combat training or advanced individual training could be conducted. This option is self-sufficient and has a limited command field exercise and field training exercise capability. The division has a robust leader cadre and will require minimum personnel in grades sergeant through captain upon mobilization. With the high personnel numbers required to conduct initial equipment training and prepare for combat operations, the division is costly. Other factors driving the cost high are the full-up brigade at ALO 3 as well as the associated division slice. A trade-off to the higher number of personnel is the fact that less personnel fills are required after mobilization. Therefore, there is less risk, which allows the commander more flexibility after mobilization. The division will afford its junior officers the opportunity to be branch qualified. Deployment time for the division varies depending on component: 77 weeks for the active component and 77 weeks for the reserve. If the initial equipment training mission is eliminated, the division, regardless of component, can deploy in 57 weeks. Option 4 contains the third highest cost for both active and reserve components.

Option 5: With approximately 8,700 personnel, Option 5 was designed to optimize the personnel fill in grades sergeant through captain. Option 5 has all of the characteristics of Option 1 with an additional 1,780 personnel. Deployment time for the division mirrors Option 1: 77 weeks for active component and 77 weeks for the reserve component; and 57 weeks are required without the initial equipment training mission. Option 5 contains the highest costs for both active and reserve components.

Options 6 and 6A.

Option 6: With approximately 7,000 personnel, Option 6 is a variation of Option 1, the major difference being the source of the of the pre-mobilization personnel. In Option 1, the cadre personnel are assigned to the division and train as a division. In Option 6, the cadre personnel are dual-hatted from the TRADOC TDA training base. These personnel perform in their daily TRADOC TDA positions. On an annual, semi-annual, or quarterly basis, these personnel mobilize and train as the cadre staff for a cadre division. The deployment time for the division is 77 weeks for the active component. If the initial equipment training mission is eliminated, the division, regardless of component, can deploy in 57 weeks.

Option 6A: With approximately 3,200 personnel, Option 6A is a variation of Option 3, the major difference being the source of the pre-mobilization personnel. In Option 3, the cadre personnel are assigned to the division and train as a division during pre-mobilization. In Option 6A, the cadre personnel are dual-hatted from the TRADOC TDA training base. These personnel perform in their daily TRADOC TDA positions. On an annual, semi-annual, or quarterly basis, these personnel mobilize and train as the cadre staff. The deployment time for the division is 77 weeks for the active component. If the initial equipment training mission is eliminated, the division, regardless of component, can deploy in 57 weeks.

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